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ABSTRACT 
The 27th Amendment to the US Constitution, which states that any adjustment in compensation 
to legislators could take effect only after a new election was held, was ratified in 1992, some 203 
years after it was first proposed. The amendment passed as a reaction of voters to a 1989 
proposal by legislators for a increase in their salaries by 51%, from $89,500 to $135,000 per 
annum. A question as to the constitutionality of an amendment that took more than two centuries 
to pass is being raised. 
 
ARTICLE 
 
The process of how to amend the U.S. Constitution is the least discussed and least examined 
aspect of the Constitution. The vagaries surrounding the amendment process were highlighted in 
1992 as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment gained momentum and eventual ratification.  
 
Compensation of Members of Congress: The Twenty-Seventh Amendment  
As one of the original proposals accompanying the Bill of Rights, and first proposed in 1789, the 
congressional pay raise amendment was included in order to limit the ability of Congress to 
change the compensation of its members. It was proposed by James Madison and later passed by 
both houses of Congress. The amendment stated: "No law, varying the compensation for the 
services of senators and representatives, shall take effect until an election of representatives shall 
have intervened." Three state conventions, concerned that members of Congress might arbitrarily 
grant themselves salary raises, proposed that no salary improvements should occur before the 
next election of representatives (Livingston 1956).  
Six states approved the amendment within two years of its proposal by Congress. In 1873, one 
more state ratified it. Then, nothing happened again until 1978 when Wyoming ratified it. Once 
put into effect, the amendment would prevent Congress from giving itself a midterm pay raise; 
the raise would be delayed until after the subsequent House of Representatives election. The 
amendment also might void cost-of-living raises that Congress placed in previous pay raise bills; 
automatic raises passed in this manner could be considered unconstitutional ("Late Vote" 1992, 
19; McAllister 1992c; Murray 1990; Moss 1992). The 24-word measure, now the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, was submitted TABULAR DATA OMITTED to 14 states for ratification 
in 1789, and after 203 years was only recently ratified in 1992.  
Fifteen states of the necessary 38 required for ratification gave their support to the amendment 
since 1989, the year Congress gave itself a large pay raise. The amendment was neglected until 
the early 1980s until it was discovered by a state legislative aide in Texas, Gregory D. Watson, 
who lead a campaign that resulted in its revival (McAllister 1992b). By May 1992, 40 states had 
ratified the congressional pay raise amendment.  
On May 14, 1992, Don Wilson, the archivist of the United States, certified the adoption of the 
amendment in accordance with Section 106b, Title I of the United States Code, thereby making 
it the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution (Taylors World of Politics 
1992; Kole 1992).  
Why did this amendment gain so much momentum since 1978, the year states began to 
reconsider it in the twentieth century?  
 
The Amendment Process  
Article V of the U.S. Constitution represents not only a means of constitutional revisions but also 
an effort to contain revolution by delineating specific procedures for amending and possibly 
reconstituting government. The framers of the Constitution instituted a set of amendment 
procedures that allowed change in an orderly fashion, with no violent and abrupt disruption that 
would destroy public and private rights (Kyvig 1986).  
Yet, the amendment process has been criticized by Wilson (1885), Bryce (1988), Ames (1896), 
Smith (1907), Livingston (1956), Dixon (1971), Burgess (1978), Schechter (1985), Dellinger 
(1986), and Berry (1986, 1987). They hold that existing constitutional amendment procedures 
require extraordinary concurrent majorities to initiate and ratify amendments and represent 
substantial hurdles to constitutional change by amendment. Many of these critics have proposed 
mechanisms for modifying the amendment process to ease its rigidity.  
Klinglesmith (1925), Musmanno (1929, 1976), Pritchett (1959, 41), Mead (1987), Ginsburg 
(1989-1990), and Vile (1991, 1992a, 1992b) disagree with the critics and claim that the 
amendment process was constructed properly and serves its designed purpose. In their view, 
amending the Constitution should be difficult and should restrain the introduction of fad 
amendments--amendments that reflect spur of the moment consensus rather than enduring 
principles on which consensus has been reached. Others note the arduous nature of the 
amendment process, but claim that any effort to alter it would meet stiff political opposition and 
hold that such change is not likely to occur (Sundquist 1986).  
Understanding why constitutional change by amendment has become more prevalent and more 
acceptable is a salient issue. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment explains how unexpected 
constitutional change can happen--how it may sneak up on us.  
 
Contrasting Views of Constitutional Change  
There are several theories of constitutional change by amendment.  
Generational Rhythms: One broad conceptual method of analyzing political outputs in general is 
to characterize political change as responsive to generational rhythms. Changes in the "rhythm of 
political generations" has a profound effect on constitutional amendment policies. Each 
generation encounters a patterned set of political events and responds to them. Elazar (1978) 
delineated the intra-generational and inter-generational character of political change and asserted 
that a rhythm (within and between generations) exists in American politics.  
Intra-generational change occurs at 25- and 40-year intervals and is defined by three stages. 
During the first stage of 10 to 15 years, actual issues and problems arise, new voters enter into 
the electoral process, and new solutions to problems are initiated. This stage is characterized by a 
few critical elections, which eventually result in a realignment of party identification (Schechter 
1985, 178).  
The second stage is an innovative period of three to four years in which new proposals are put 
forth to respond to the recognized problem. New political elites consolidate political control over 
a period of about 10 years. As stability is achieved, changes are initiated and institutionalized. 
The last stage lasts only a few years and closes the chapter of this generation as most of its 
proposals are ratified and opens a new chapter for an upcoming generation (Schechter 1985).  
An inter-generational transition also occurs. It is not possible for the new generation to break 
totally with the old one. The same institutional arrangements and many similar issues carry over 
from one generation to the next. Some of the cultural norms and traditions of old generations are 
adopted and maintained by the new generation. In addition, the presence of some of the older 
generation political elites makes a complete break with the past impossible (Elazar 1978).  
Using Elazar's typology, Schechter (1985) extrapolated five political generations: (1) the 
Founding generation (1789-1815); (2) the post-Civil War generation (1876-1948); (3) the Urban 
Frontier (1876-1919); (4) the New Deal generation (1920-1947); and (5) the post-World War II 
generation (1949-1978).  
The clustering of amendments by generation is notable. The first 12 amendments were passed 
during the Founding generation. On average, most generations propose and adopt at least four 
amendments. The only generation not to propose an amendment was the Urban Frontier 
generation. The majority of amendment efforts, from introduction to Congress to the final 
ratification of the proposed amendment, averaged about 14.3 years. Of the original 26 
amendments, five of them took over 30 years to take effect, from introduction in Congress to 
final ratification in the states. These included the abolition of slavery, the direct election of 
senators, prohibition, women's suffrage, the D.C. presidential vote, and the right of 18-year-olds 
to vote (Schechter 1985).  
Shifting Political Coalitions: New political coalitions form and seek to maintain power by 
changing and rearranging rules of governance. The new dominant coalition is driven by 
grievances, promoting them to engage in a constitutional strategy that usually results in power 
loss for the new coalition's opponents (Grimes 1978). Scholars of this persuasion claim that 
amendment politics can be described by three major factors: (1) amendments tend to be passed in 
clusters; (2) amendment politics usually involves a regional or sectional aspect; and (3) 
amendment politics is characterized by a thrust towards equalitarian democracy (Grimes 1978, 
25-26).  
The use of several examples is illustrative. The Bill of Rights lessened the power of the 
Federalists and heightened the power of the Jeffersonians. The Civil War Amendments took 
power from the Southern Democrats and strengthened the Northeast. The Progressive 
Amendments weakened the eastern Republican Establishment by allowing the income tax and 
direct election of senators while the New Deal had the effect of cutting down the power of 
western Progressives by repealing prohibition. Finally the New Deal coalition was struck a blow 
by Republicans with the passage of the Twenty-Second Amendment, and the more recent civil 
liberties amendments have served to weaken the Old South's political structure (Grimes 1978, 
166; Vose 1972).  
TABLE 1 
  
Stages of Change for Structure of Government Amendments 
  
Political        Widespread      Political       Constitutional 
Triggering      Awareness of     Coalitions         Change 
Event            Structural        Form 
                  Problem 
  
(STAGE ONE)     (STAGE TWO)     (STAGE THREE)     (STAGE FOUR) 
  
Source: Whicker et al., 1987a: 65. 
Political Triggering Events and Structural Amendments: Whicker, Strickland, and Moore 
(1987a, 1987b) attempt to explain the additional amendments to the Constitution by dividing the 
amendments into two categories: structure of government amendments and civil liberties 
amendments. These authors suggest that structure of government amendments are triggered by 
political crises or events whereas technological advances and economic changes are more likely 
to explain civil liberties amendment ratifications. Since the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is 
primarily a structural constitutional amendment, a focus on their model of structural 
constitutional change is required.  
In this model, politics, particularly elite-based politics, is more important in determining 
structure of government change than civil liberties revision. In the first stage, their model 
suggests that a political triggering event focuses attention upon a structural weakness in the 
government. Awareness of this deficiency builds motivation to rectify the weakness among 
relevant politicians and political elites in the second stage. As cognizance and motivation to 
remedy the deficiency increases, political coalitions form by stage three to demand a formal 
system response to the problem, which is highlighted by the political triggering event. In the 
final stage, a new constitutional amendment is ratified and the structural deficiency is eliminated.  
 
The Stealth Amendment: Congressional Pay Raise as Triggering Event  
A Confidence Crisis: The Twenty-Seventh Amendment was not ratified due to generational 
rhythms or shifting political coalitions. More likely, it was triggered by the growing 
disenchantment with congressional perquisites and arrogance. The probable passage of the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment was further  
reinforced by the "rubbergate" scandal on the Hill, as numerous members of the House of 
Representatives engaged in check kiting. When polled on this, very few Americans (22%) were 
satisfied with explanations offered by various members of Congress, and few were very likely or 
somewhat likely (20%) to reelect congressional representatives who were among the worst 
offenders (Hugick 1992).  
Various public opinion polls indicate that substantial numbers of Americans have lacked 
confidence in government institutions, particularly Congress, which is supposed to be the most 
representative and responsive branch of government. In a Gallup poll conducted in September 
1988, 8% of the respondents had a great deal of confidence in Congress, 27% had quite a lot of 
confidence, 45% had some confidence, 16% had very little confidence, and 2% had no 
confidence in Congress as an institution. Compared to churches and organized religion, the 
military, the U.S. Supreme Court, banks, public schools, newspapers, television, organized labor 
and big business, Congress in 1988 ranked seventh highest among institutions in confidence 
levels. Congress ranked above only television, organized labor, and big business, receiving a 
rating of 35% by those who had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence TABULAR DATA 
OMITTED in the institution (Gallup Report 1988, 37).  
TABLE 2 
  
State Ratification Dates of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 
  
Year           Date                  State 
  
1789           December 19           Maryland 
               December 22           North Carolina 
  
1790           January 19            South Carolina 
               January 28            Delaware 
  
1791           November 3            Vermont 
               December 15           Virginia 
  
1873           May 6                 Ohio 
  
1978           March 3               Wyoming 
  
1983           April 27              Maine 
  
1984           April 18              Colorado 
  
1985           February 21           South Dakota 
               March 7               New Hampshire 
               April 3               Arizona 
               May 23                Tennessee 
               July 10               Oklahoma 
  
1986           February 14           New Mexico 
               February 24           Indiana 
               February 26           Utah 
  
1987           March 5               Arkansas 
               March 17              Montana 
               May 13                Connecticut 
               June 30               Wisconsin 
  
1988           February 2            Georgia 
               March 10              West Virginia 
               July 6                Louisiana 
  
1989           February 7            Iowa 
               March 23              Idaho 
               April 26              Nevada 
               May 5                 Alaska 
               May 19                Oregon 
               May 22                Minnesota 
               May 25                Texas 
  
1990           April 4               Kansas 
               May 31                Florida 
  
1991           March 25              North Dakota 
  
1992           May 5                 Alabama 
               May 5                 Missouri 
               May 6                 Illinois 
               May 7                 Michigan 
               May 7                 New Jersey 
  
Source: Michaelis 1992a; Taylors World of Politics 1992. 
In 1989, only 32% of Americans had a great deal or a lot of confidence in Congress as an 
institution; in 1990, this confidence dropped to 24% (Gallup Report 1989, 20-21; Gallup and 
Newport 1991). By October 1991, Congress attained the lowest confidence ratings of any 
institution--a mere 18% had a great deal or a lot of confidence in Congress (Gallup and Newport 
1991).  
In a Gallup Poll conducted in July 1992, the honesty and ethics of 25 professionals, including 
pharmacists, medical doctors, college teachers, engineers, police officers, journalists, bankers, 
and insurance salespersons, were compared. Those who were rated low or very low on honesty 
and ethical standards included lawyers (36%), U.S. senators (40%), U.S. representatives (43%), 
and car salespersons (59%). Elected officials in this poll experienced the sharpest decline in 
ratings in 16 years of polling. Congress, in particular, experienced the most rapid decline with 
only 13% of Americans believing that the U.S. Senate had high standards and only 11% 
believing this for members of the House. Only insurance salespersons, advertising practitioners, 
and car salespersons ranked lower than Congress (McAneny 1992).  
Congressional Pay Raise Proposals as Triggering Event: In 1989, a nationwide poll revealed that 
82% of Americans opposed the 51% pay raise proposal that would increase the salaries of 
members of Congress from $89,500 to $135,000 per year. Only 15% favored it (Gallup Report 
1989). Although initially squelched, pay raises did eventually go into effect. Through 1989, 
members of both houses of Congress were paid $89,500. But in 1990, Senators earned $98,400. 
By 1991, House of Representatives members' salaries were raised to $125,100 and pay for 
senators rose to $101,900. The 1989 Ethics Reform Act provided for cost-of-living raises to 
make up for inflationary losses from years when COLAs were not added to their salaries (Burger 
1991, 1992). With the year of the angry voter and an anti-incumbent sentiment being heralded 
both in 1990 and 1992, it is no surprise that the public was searching for ways to rein in 
perceived arrogance (Hook 1990).  
Groups such as Citizens Against Government Waste argued that pay increases ought to be linked 
to performance--implying that congressional performance on some issues, e.g., the economy, had 
not been good. Other groups, such as Ralph Nader's Congressional Accountability Project, 
Coalitions for America, National Taxpayers Union and Citizens for a Sound Economy, were also 
activated to roll back pay raises. The pressure exerted by groups in addition to angry voters led 
Congress to implement the 51% raise more gradually. Many voters could not understand the 
need for pay hikes, given that a salary of $89,500 put congressional members among the top 1% 
of the nation's wage earners (Clift 1989; Deutsch 1991; Malin 1990; Shapiro 1989).  
Since structural changes affect mostly politicians and elites, structural constitutional change is 
more likely to be elite-based whereas civil liberties constitutional change is more likely to be 
popularly based. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment captured the attention of organized groups as 
well as political elites. The precipitating or triggering events that drew the attention of political 
elites were the low estimation of Congress by the public as well as the public's outrage over 
recent congressional pay raises, in addition to other allegations of corruption involving various 
congressional members. Congress, weakened by the savings and loan debacle, House check 
kiting, and savings and loan banking scandals, as well as the mismanagement of the House Post 
Office, became a target of frustrated voters and reformers.  
A Policy Entrepreneur: The Twenty-Seventh Amendment first caught the eye of Gregory D. 
Watson, a student at the University of Texas at Austin. In 1982, Watson was researching whether 
Congress could extend the ratification deadline for the Equal Rights Amendment and, in the 
course of this research, ran across Madison's stymied proposal. Watson worked night and day to 
revive the pay raise amendment and pushed for its passage in state legislatures. Watson had used 
$6,000 of his own money, as of 1992, to sponsor a nationwide effort to ratify the Madison 
amendment (McAllister 1992a; Murray 1990; Moss 1992; Parker 1989). Although he got a "C" 
on his research paper, Watson is credited with influencing 26 state legislatures to ratify the 
congressional pay raise amendment.  
Political Coalitions Form: Awareness of the structural problem--Congress voting itself a pay 
raise at any time, and other scandals--grew. State legislatures began to ratify the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment in rapid succession. Fifteen states, or almost 40% of those votes needed for 
ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, gave their support between February 7, 1989, 
and May 7, 1992.  
Congress was under pressure to accept the amendment. In order to restore the legitimacy of the 
institution, many members of Congress, particularly newly elected members, felt compelled to 
support the amendment. In 1990, there were at least 14 congressional freshmen who supported 
the congressional pay raise amendment. By 1992, there were at least 35 Republicans and 
Democrats in the freshman class of Congress who supported the amendment (Wilkinson 1991; 
Garrett 1992a). Representative Charles Lukens stated that the push for support of the amendment 
was due to a feeling that "the American people are losing faith in Congress as an institution" 
(Wilkinson 1991). Political coalitions, especially among freshman members of Congress, formed 
to back the amendment, eventually gaining reluctant support from old-timers and sometimes 
challengers of the amendment such as Tom Foley, Speaker of the House, and George Mitchell, 
Majority Leader of the Senate.  
 
Legitimacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment  
Numerous scholars and politicians have been concerned about the legitimacy of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, and have questioned its contemporaneousness or its timeliness (Vile 
1992a; Garrett 1992b; Michaelis 1992a). Dick Howard, a constitutional law professor at the 
University of Virginia, was quoted as stating that he couldn't imagine the framers of the 
Constitution being unconcerned about how long it takes to ratify an amendment, indicating that 
in his view the Twenty-Seventh Amendment fails the contemporaneousness test. Norman 
Ornstein, a congressional scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, stated that the amendment 
did not meet the standard of timeliness. Walter Dellinger, a constitutional law professor at Duke 
University, characterized the Twenty-Seventh Amendment as a "casual" amendment. Dellinger 
also pointed out that James Madison, the author of the congressional pay raise amendment, was 
not overly supportive of the proposal at the time. As the amendment was debated in the First 
Congress, concerns were expressed that the unpopularity of low salaries might prevent good men 
from pursuing political offices (Horwitz 1992; Michaelis 1992c).  
The U.S. Supreme Court, in its review of amending process issues, has been ambiguous in its 
decisions on the question of whether the Twenty-Seventh Amendment actually met the formal 
requirements of Article V. In Dillon v. Gloss (1921), the Supreme Court upheld the seven-year 
limit on ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, as specified by Congress. The reasoning 
behind this conclusion was based on the idea that Article V "implied" that ratification of an 
amendment should occur within some "reasonable" time period which Congress is free to 
establish. The Court specifically stated:  
. . . as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people and is to be effective 
when had in three-fourths of the States, there is fair implication that it must be sufficiently 
contemporaneous in that number of States to reflect the will of the people in all sections at 
relatively the same period, which of course ratification scattered through a long series of years 
would not do (Dillon v. Gloss, 253 U.S. 368, 375).  
The Supreme Court also held that they found nothing in Article V to support the notion that once 
an amendment is proposed that it could be open for ratification indefinitely. The assumption in 
Dillon was that if states were allowed to consider amendments over a longer time frame than 
seven years, it would be possible to pass an amendment years down the road that no longer had 
the support of a substantial proportion of the population (Mead 1987). The Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, however, had no ratification time limit deadline to meet.  
In Coleman v. Miller (1939), the Supreme Court deferred to Congress, giving it the authority to 
set a reasonable time for ratification and to determine whether the lapse of time made an 
amendment proposal obsolete prior to receiving the required number of ratification votes from 
the states. Backing away somewhat from its more firm stance in Dillon, the Supreme Court in 
Coleman declared the issue of whether amendments were timely or not a political question--a 
question to be left up to congressional discretion (Caplan 1988, 110-14; Edel 1981; Vile 1992a).  
It has been argued that by deferring to Congress in the Coleman decision, the Supreme Court left 
important constitutional questions about Article V unanswered. As a result, some major 
constitutional issues may be resolved on the basis of partisan whims, not stable constitutional 
rule of law. Vile (1992a) argued that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment should not have been 
accepted by Congress, nor should it set precedent for future court actions. Because the amending 
process surrounding the Twenty-Seventh was "scattered through a long series of years" and had 
been dormant for long periods of time, it should be regarded as a "stealth" amendment. It 
presents the specter of the revival of other amendments, which received only a few early state 
ratifications. It also appears to be a circumvention of the process--a short-cut around 
contemporary sentiment and an infusion of uncertainty about the fundamental basis of our law.  
Although Representative Tom Foley (D-WA) and Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) eventually 
accepted the need for the congressional pay raise amendment, they also voiced concerns about 
the time lapse between state ratification votes. Byrd, in particular, was upset with archivist Don 
Wilson for failing to postpone certification of the amendment until Congress could probe the 
questions about the validity of the ratification and engage in congressional discussion and debate 
about the necessity of the amendment (Michaelis 1992c; McAllister 1992b).  
Others have argued that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is legitimate. Thomas Durbin, a 
legislative attorney for the Congressional Research Service, claimed that states ratified the 
amendment in good faith, believing that they had the authority to do so and that their votes 
would count. Representative Hamilton Fish (R-NY) also argued that the recent rash of 
ratifications since 1982 indicated the contemporaneousness of the amendment proposal 
(DeBenedictis 1992; Michaelis 1992a; Michaelis 1992c).  
 
Conclusions  
With congressional acquiescence and with certification by the archivist, it appears that the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment is here to stay and that its legitimacy has been established. When 
structural crises or problems emerge and political elites are activated, the Constitution can be 
amended by stealth and with great rapidity. The generational rhythm thesis does not help explain 
why the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was adopted because the amendment's ratification period 
extends over a 203-year time period, crossing numerous generations. The shifting political 
coalitions explanation offered by Grimes (1978) also does not apply in this case because there is 
no regional or ideological pattern associated with the passage of the amendment; regional or 
sectional adoption of the amendment in state legislatures was random, and the amendment 
garnered bipartisan political support. Constitutional change by amendment in this case was 
caused by political triggering events, which prodded key politicians at the state and national 
levels to recognize a structural deficiency and to pursue a constitutional remedy.  
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